Richard C. Thompson and Paul C. Jensen v. The Utah State Tax Commsision, Pam  Hendrickson, R. Bruce Johnson, Palmer DePaulis, and Marc B. Johnson : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2003
Richard C. Thompson and Paul C. Jensen v. The
Utah State Tax Commsision, Pam Hendrickson, R.
Bruce Johnson, Palmer DePaulis, and Marc B.
Johnson : Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John C. McCarrey; Timothy A. Bodily; Assistant Attorneys General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney
General;Kevin Howard; Gregory Phillips; Daniel Andersen; David Hansen; Howard, Phillips and
Andersen; Attorneys for Appellees.
Gary A. Dodge; Kevin W. Bates; Hatch, James and Dodge; Attorneys for Appellants.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Richard C. Thompson and Paul C. Jensen v. The Utah State Tax Commsision, Pam Hendrickson, R. Bruce Johnson, Palmer
DePaulis, and Marc B. Johnson, No. 20030506.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2412
pi a. 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Richard C. Thompson and Paul C. 
Jensen on behalf of themselves and all 
other similarly situated taxpayers, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
The Utah State Tax Commission, Pam 
Hendrickson, R. Bruce Johnson, Palmer 
DePaulis, and Marc B. Johnson, as 
Commissioners of the Utah State Tax 
Commission and the Utah State 
Retirement System, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Supreme Court No. 20030506-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL D[STRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE RONALD E. NEHRING 
Gary A. Dodge 
Kevin W. Bates 
HATCH, JAMES & 
DODGE 
10 West Broadway, Suite 
400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)363-6363 
Attorney for Appellants 
John C. McCarrey, Esq. 
Timothy A. Bodily, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Esq. 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5th 
Floor 
P.O. Box 140874 
Attorneys for Appellees, 
Utah State Tax 
Commission 
Pam Hendrickson, R. 
Bruce Johnson, Palmer 
Depaulis and Marc B. 
Johnson 
Kevin A. Howard [4343] 
Gregory D. Phillips [4645] 
Daniel D. Andersen [5907] 
David B.Hansen [8197] 
HOWARD, PHILLIPS & 
ANDERSEN 
560 East 200 South, Suite 
300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone:(801) 366-7471 
Attorneys for Appellees, 
Utah State Retirement 
^ U T A M / I L E D 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
NOV 2 1 2003 
^BARTHOLOMEW 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Richard C. Thompson and Paul C. 
Jensen on behalf of themselves and all 
other similarly situated taxpayers, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
The Utah State Tax Commission, Pam 
Hendrickson, R. Bruce Johnson, Palmer 
DePaulis, and Marc B. Johnson, as 
Commissioners of the Utah State Tax 
Commission and the Utah State 
Retirement System, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Supreme Court No. 20030506-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE RONALD E. NEHRING 
Gary A. Dodge 
Kevin W. Bates 
HATCH, JAMES & 
DODGE 
10 West Broadway, Suite 
400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)363-6363 
Attorney for Appellants 
John C. McCarrey, Esq. 
Timothy A. Bodily, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Esq. 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5th 
Floor 
P.O. Box 140874 
Attorneys for Appellees, 
Utah State Tax 
Commission 
Pam Hendrickson, R. 
Bruce Johnson, Palmer 
Depaulis and Marc B. 
Johnson 
Kevin A. Howard [4343] 
Gregory D. Phillips [4645] 
Daniel D. Andersen [5907] 
David B.Hansen [8197] 
HOWARD, PHILLIPS & 
ANDERSEN 
560 East 200 South, Suite 
300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone:(801) 366-7471 
Attorneys for Appellees, 
Utah State Retirement 
Board 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FORREVIEW 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT I 
THE ENACTMENT OF A 3% INCREASE TO STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME TO 
SUBSTITUTE FOR THE LOSS OF A RETIREMENT INCOME TAX 
EXEMPTION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PROHIBITION 
AGAINST DISCRIMINATORY TAX TREATMENT UNDER DAVIS 
V. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY 9 
A. Davis Supports the Proposition that States May Increase State and 
Local Government Employee Compensation and Benefits to 
Compensate for the Loss of the Income Tax Exemption 9 
B. The 3% Increase in Retirement Benefits to State and Local 
Government Employees is Not a Tax Rebate 12 
ARGUMENT II 
THE 3% RETIREMENT BENEFIT ENHANCEMENT SERVES AS A 
SUBSTANTIAL SUBSTITUTE FOR THE LOSS OF THE 
RETIREMENT INCOME EXEMPTION AND AS SUCH CANNOT 
BE AN ILLEGAL TAX REBATE 18 
i 
CONCLUSION 20 
ADDENDA 23 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Almeter v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 
53 Va. Cir. 429, 2000 WL 1687589 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000) 
Cert, refused, No. 010270, Va. (April 20,2000), Cert, denied, 122 S. Ct. 202 
(Oct. 1 2001) 2, 17 
Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 
489 U.S. 803 (1989) 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9,10, 11, 12, 13,15,17, 18,20, 21 
Driggs v. Utah Teachers' Retirement Board, 
142 P.2d 657 (Utah 1943) 19 
Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Board, 
110 P.2d 93 (Utah 1988) 19 
Newcomb v. Ogden City Public School Teachers' Retirement Commission, 
243 P.2d 941 (Utah 1952) 19 
Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue, 
895 P.2d 1348 (Ore. 1995) 2, 12, 13, 14, 17 
Sheehy v. Public Employees Retirement Division, 
864 P.2d 762 (Mont. 1993) 15,16,17 
Vogl v. Department of Revenue, 
960 P.2d 373 (Ore. 1998) 12,14, 15, 17,20 
Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 
910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996) 1 
iii 
STATUTES 
4U.S.C. § 111 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 1, 5, 6, 7, 20, 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-608 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) 1 
iv 
Appellee, Utah State Retirement Board ("Board"), through its counsel, respectfully 
submits this Brief to the Court. 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(3)(j)(1953 as amended). This Appeal results from an Order dated May 13, 2003 by the 
Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, Third Judicial District Court, which granted Appellees' 
Motion to Dismiss based on Appellants' failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Does Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701, which increases the retirement allowance of state 
and local government retirees, constitute an illegal tax rebate in violation of the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Judge (now Justice) Nehring's Order dismissing Appellant's claim is a question of 
law, and, as such, his ruling is subject to a correctness standard. Whipple v. American Fork 
Irrigation Co.. 910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996). 
1 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 49 U.S. 803 (1989), is folly determinative 
of the issue presented to this Court. Almeter v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 53 Va. Cir. 
429,2000 WL 1687589 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000), cert, refused, No. 010270, Va. (April 20,2001), 
cert, denied, 122 S. Ct. 202 (Oct. 1,2001), is the leading state court decision relating to the 
issue presented and Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348 (Ore. 1995), 
provides authorative precedent from a neighboring jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Richard C. Thompson and Paul C. Jensen, federal retirees, on behalf of themselves 
and all other similarly situated taxpayers, filed suit against the Utah State Tax Commission 
claiming discriminatory tax treatment in violation of the Davis decision. The Tax 
Commission moved to dismiss the Complaint on February 4, 2002, and also argued that the 
Utah State Retirement Board should be added as a defendant. On August 23, 2002, the 
District Court ordered that the Board be added as a defendant and allowed the Board "to 
weigh in on the pending cross motions to dismiss" because the Board was "uniquely situated 
to protect its rights and the rights of its members." Record, at 230-32. On October 9,2002, 
the Board filed its own Motion to Dismiss, and subsequently the Tax Commission renewed 
its Motion to Dismiss. Record, at 244-64. 
On May 7,2003, the District Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and Final 
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Judgment against Plaintiffs was entered on May 13, 2003. Record, at 346-57. This Appeal 
was filed by Plaintiffs/Appellants on June 3, 2003. Record, at 368-70. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The relevant facts are not in dispute. 
PRE-DAVIS LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY 
1. Even before the United States Supreme Court issued Davis, states were well aware 
of the case winding its way through the appellate courts. These events caused Utah to 
address the issue as early as 1988. 
2. The 1988 Utah Legislature's initial reaction to this issue was not to eliminate the tax 
exemption totally for state retirees, but to remove the tax exemption only for those state and 
local government employees who began participating in the retirement system after January 
1, 1989. See, H.B. 221 "INCOME TAX - STATE RETIREMENT EXEMPTION, passed 
February 23, 1988. The obvious net effect of this amendment was to guarantee that all state 
and local government employees participating in a retirement systems on December 31,1988, 
would not lose that tax exemption. 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DAVIS RULING 
3. The Davis Court found that a state tax structure which exempted the retirement 
income of state and local government retirees while taxing the retirement income of federal 
employees violated the Doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity and 4U.S.C. § 111. 
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The Court offered States the choice of eliminating the preferential tax treatment for the 
retirement income of its retirees, or extending the same benefits and protections to federal 
retirees. 
4. The Utah Legislature responded immediately. The retirement income tax exemption 
for state retirees in the Retirement Code was eliminated, and the Income Tax Code was 
amended to implement a new retirement income tax structure that satisfied the U.S. Supreme 
Court mandate that the tax structure not discriminate against federal retirees based on the 
source of the income. 
5. First, the Governor called the Legislature into a Second Special Session in 1989 and 
the Legislature passed House Bill 4, "PERSONAL RETIREMENT EXEMPTION FOR 
ELDERLY." The bill contained two essential provisions, an amendment to the retirement 
code, Utah Code Ann. §49-1-608, to eliminate the retirement income tax exemption for all 
employees, including the group who were "grandfathered" with an income tax exemption 
in 1988 under H.B. 221, and the creation of a uniform and enhanced retirement income tax 
exemption for all sources of retirement related income, including not only state and federal 
retirees' income, but also private employment retirement income and increased personal 
exemptions upon reaching age 65. This was clearly designed to comply effectively and fully 
with the Davis mandate. 
6. Secondly, in that same Special Session, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 8, 
"RETIREMENT BENEFITS INCREASE," which was clearly designed to provide some 
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form of replacement or substitute benefit for state and local government employees to make 
up for the loss of their state retirement income tax exemption which had been taken away 
byHouseBill4. Senate Bill 8 enacted Utah Code Ann. §49-1-701 and set forth the specific 
eligibility requirements for state or local government retirees to qualify for a 3% increase to 
their retirement allowance: 
a. The 3% adjustment would be given to all retirees covered by a system 
administered by the Board who (i) were members of the system and entitled to a tax 
exemption prior to 1989; and (ii) retired on or after January 1, 1989 or were already retired 
on that date. The Board made no distinction between those retirees located in the State of 
Utah whose retirement allowances would be subject to the tax and those who were located 
out of State. In other words, the 3% increase was paid to every eligible retiree after January 
1,1989. Utah Code Ann. §49-l-701(l)(3)(1989). 
b. The 3% adjustment would be added to the existing retirement base calculated 
pursuant to statutory formula under the applicable retirement system pursuant to Title 49, and 
would then become the new base for future increases in the retirement allowance, (which 
might include, for example, the variable cost of living adjustment provided annually based 
on inflation factors). The 3% adjustment then would be part of the base retirement allowance 
(which has always been considered a vested right for retirees by Utah courts, and thus not 
subject to future elimination or decrease by legislative or Board action). Utah Code Ann. 
§49-1-701(2) (1989). Senate Bill 8 actually included an amendment requested by 
5 
Representative Harward to allow the 3% benefit to be increased, decreased, or even 
eliminated if by July 1, 1990 the Legislature came up with a more favorable and employee 
friendly tax reform package. Evidently no such plan surfaced since Representative Harward 
himself sponsored the legislation less than six months later in the 1990 Annual Legislative 
Session, H.B. 115 "RETIREMENT ALLOWANCE INCREASE AMENDMENTS," which 
eliminated the very same provision. 
c. Each year, the Board was directed to certify to the Legislature the cost, 
expressed as a percentage of salary of participating employees in the various state plans (also 
called the contribution rate), necessary to fund the new 3 % adjustment to the allowance. This 
funding mechanism (as had been the case historically with all retirement benefit 
enhancements) would ensure that the Board would amortize the cost of this new retirement 
benefit over the remaining actuarial amortization period. The benefit would then be reviewed 
annually by the Board, its actuaries, and the Legislature to ensure actuarial and fiscal 
soundness as required by the Retirement Code. Any resultant increases or decreases to the 
contribution rate would be taken into account during salary and benefit negotiations each 
year during the Annual General Session between the Legislature and state funded public 
employee groups. Notably, as with other statutory retirement benefits, the Legislature did 
not then, and does not today, fund the 3% adjustment by direct legislative appropriation of 
tax dollars to eligible retirees. Utah Code Ann. §49-1-701(6) (1989). 
d. Two other provisions cited by the Appellants in their oral argument on the 
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Motion to Dismiss were not part of the 1989 Legislation. Indeed, the provisions were not 
added until five years later in the 1994 Annual General Session. See, H.B. 155 (1994). The 
first provision required the Board to report the cost of the 3% adjustment separately from 
the costs of the other benefits, which would remind the Legislature of its effect on the 
soundness of the retirement systems.1 Utah Code Ann. § 49-l-701(6)(b). 
The second provision prohibited the use of the 3% benefit enhancement in 
comparative studies of public employee benefits. While Plaintiffs suggested in oral argument 
before Judge Nehring that the passage of this provision is proof that the Legislature did not 
consider the 3% to be a true retirement benefit, the Legislature's motives were much more 
practical. The Legislature passed this provision five years after the passage of the 3% 
adjustment. It was never part of the original 3% benefit adjustment. This provision, by its 
own language, was simply an agreed upon principle between the Legislature and public 
employees that it would be unfair to use the cost of the new 3% benefit in comparative 
compensation studies since the new benefit was a substantial substitute for the tax exemption, 
the value of which was not used in comparative studies either. 
1
 It should be noted and remembered that while the cost was reported separately, it 
was not funded separately. The total cost was still recognized as part of the total 
employees' compensation package and not funded by separate legislative appropriations 
from tax revenues produced from taxing state retirement income, which is at the core of 
Plaintiffs' tax rebate argument. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
After Davis was decided almost fifteen years ago, Utah, along with numerous other 
states, immediately implemented the solutions approved by the Davis Court to remedy the 
discriminatory tax treatment suffered by Appellants' class. In Utah, as in most other states, 
the solution involved the repeal of the state and local retirees' retirement income exemption. 
In some states, including Utah, Oregon, Montana and Virginia, the Legislature also granted 
increased retirement benefits to state and local government employees to make up for, or 
offset, in some measure, the impact caused by the loss of the income tax exemption. While 
Appellants weave an interesting yam comparing these benefit enhancements to illegal tax 
rebates, the plain and simple facts of this case, as well as the holdings of the courts in our 
sister states on this issue, will lead this Court to the inescapable conclusion that the 
Legislature engaged in an appropriate exercise of its legislative power in providing a 
substantial substitute to its employees to replace the loss of a tax exemption while at the same 
time honoring the Davis Court mandate to provide equal tax treatment. 
Because Appellants cannot seriously argue that the Legislature cannot grant increased 
retirement benefits to its public servants, Appellants are reduced to a creative, albeit 
misguided, attempt to recast the benefit enhancement as a direct dollar-for-dollar offset, i.e., 
a tax rebate, or close thereto, of state retirees' tax liability. Such an argument would be 
persuasive if it were true but the undisputed facts on the record plainly reveal a much less 
sinister legislative design. 
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First and foremost, the benefit enhancement bears no relationship to the tax structure 
in Utah. Utah's income tax rate is 7% - the benefit increase is 3%. Second, the benefit 
enhancement is paid to all eligible retirees, not just those residing in Utah. Third, the benefit 
is funded by actuarially set contribution rates and funded by retirement fund monies, not by 
separate legislative appropriation based on retirees' increased tax obligations. Finally, and 
most persuasively, this Court should uphold the benefit increase because the Davis Court 
expressly recognized the right of each state to provide such a benefit increase to its retirees 
to make up for the loss of their retirement income exemption. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE ENACTMENT OF A 3% INCREASE TO STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME TO SUBSTITUTE 
FOR THE LOSS OF A RETIREMENT INCOME TAX EXEMPTION DOES 
NOT VIOLATE THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCRIMINATORY TAX 
TREATMENT UNDER DAVIS V. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
TREASURY. 
A. Davis Supports the Proposition that States May Increase State and Local 
Government Employee Compensation and Benefits to Compensate for the 
Loss of the Income Tax Exemption. 
Appellants erroneously argue that Davis precludes any legislative enactment of 
compensation or retirement benefit enhancements to offset state retirees' loss of their 
retirement income tax exemption. Appellant's Brief at 16,17. In support of this proposition, 
they cite the Davis Court's statement that future discrimination against federal retirees could 
be avoided: 
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. . .either by extending the tax exemption to retired federal 
employees (or to all retired employees), or by eliminating the 
exemption for retired state and local government employees. 
Davis, 489 U.S. at 818. 
Utah, as well as the vast majority of states affected by the Davis ruling, fully complied 
with the Supreme Court mandate by eliminating the retirement income tax exemption for 
retired state and local government employees. The retirement income tax structure in Utah 
is now the same for federal and state employees. Appellants would now have this Court 
expand the Supreme Court's directive with respect to the tax exemption to include an 
outright prohibition against any increases in compensation or benefits for state and local 
government employees which "may be related" to the loss of the retirement income tax 
exemption. And Appellants argue that such an interpretation is warranted because the 
creation of the 3% benefit enhancement for state and local government employees was an 
"unsanctioned third option" in violation of the Court's own proffered remedies. Appellants' 
Brief at 16. 
Not only is this interpretation unwarranted, but it is also inconsistent with Davis itself. 
Both the majority and minority opinions in Davis discussed openly the possibility that states 
might actually increase either their employee compensation or retirement benefits to 
compensate their retirees for the loss of their tax exemption. 
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, advocated for state rights in these matters: 
10 
. . .The state may always compensate in pay or salary for what 
it assesses in taxes . . . It trivializes the Supremacy Clause to 
interpret it as prohibiting the States from providing through this 
limited tax exemption what the state has an unquestionable right 
to provide through increased retirement benefits. 
Davis. 489 U.S. at 824. 
The majority, led by Justice Kennedy, picked up on the minority opinion discussion 
regarding the states' ability to offset the net effect of the Davis decision by increasing 
compensation or benefits: 
In order to provide the same after-tax benefits to all retired state 
employees by means of increased salaries or benefit payments 
instead of a tax exemption, the State would have to increase its 
outlays by more than the cost of the current exemption, since the 
increased payments to retirees would result in higher federal 
income tax payments in some circumstances. This fact serves to 
illustrate the impact on the Federal government of the State's 
discriminatory tax exemption for state retirees. Taxes enacted to 
reduce the State's employment costs at the expense of the 
federal treasury are the type of discriminatory legislation that the 
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity is intended to bar. 
IdL, at 2, citing 489 U.S. at 815 n. 4. 
Utah addressed the concerns expressed by the majority specifically by the elimination 
of the tax exemption for state retirement income (where the exemption served to reduce the 
state's employment costs at the expense of the federal treasury), and by the enactment of a 
3% benefit enhancement (which serves to increase both state employee costs to Utah 
government and federal income tax receipts at the federal treasury). Combined, these two 
actions ensure that the purposes of intergovernmental tax immunity are not undermined while 
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permitting the states' reasonable latitude in responding to the Davis directives and its 
commitments to its own employees. Judge Nehring understood this principal in his order 
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss: 
I have reviewed the reported cases addressing similar challenges 
to legislative responses to Davis (citing cases).. . 
Irrespective of outcome, these cases recognize that the Davis 
Court did not foreclose, and in fact anticipated, a state's ability 
to respond to the Court's holding by increasing benefits to its 
retirees. 
Record, at 349. 
This Court should affirm Judge Nehring's Order and dismiss this claim. 
B. The 3% Increase in Retirement Benefits to State and Local Government 
Employees is Not a Tax Rebate. 
Utah was not alone in fashioning a legislative remedy to Davis which federal retirees 
found offensive. Four other state Supreme Court decisions in three states have ruled on the 
merits of retirement benefit enhancements enacted in direct response to Davis. 
Two of these decisions came from the Oregon Supreme Court and were a result of two 
distinct and separate legislative attempts to provide increased benefits to state and local 
government employees to compensate, in some measure, for the loss of their retirement 
income exemption pursuant to Davis. Read together, these two cases, Ragsdale v. 
Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348 (Or. 1995) and Vogl v. Department of Revenue, 960 
P.2d 373 (Or. 1998), provide an informative and authorative discussion of the struggles 
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experienced by State Legislatures as they attempted to implement the Davis mandate while 
simultaneously keeping contractual and other commitments to valued state workers. Even 
more importantly, these cases provide valuable assistance to this Court in probing the 
circumstances pursuant to which a legitimate retirement benefit increase could become an 
illegal tax rebate. 
In Ragsdale, the Oregon Supreme Court reviewed Oregon's initial response to Davis. 
As in Utah, Oregon repealed the tax exemption granted to Oregon state employees. The 
relevant tax code section was also amended to eliminate a provision excluding Oregon state 
retirement benefits from taxation, thus providing the non-discriminatory tax structure 
mandated by Davis. Oregon Laws 1991, Chapter 823, sections 1 and 3. At the same time, 
the Oregon Legislature also increased retirement benefits for state employees. Oregon Laws 
1991, Chapter 796. The Oregon replacement benefit was based on employees' years of 
service in the retirement system and ranged from 1% for employees with 10-20 years of 
service to 4% for employees with 30 or more years of service. 
As in Utah, the Oregon Retirement Fund was responsible for providing the funding 
mechanism for the benefit. The Oregon Legislature made no direct legislative appropriation 
for distribution to state retirees. Oregon also prohibited the retirement system from paying 
increased benefits in any year in which the retirement benefits were exempt from the Oregon 
income tax. And, as in Utah, federal retirees living in Oregon claimed that the replacement 
retirement benefit was an illegal tax rebate. Under this set of facts, virtually identical to 
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those before this Court, the Ragsdale Court rejected the federal retiree claims that the 
benefit enhancement was a tax rebate and upheld the retirement benefit enhancement. 
Four years after the Oregon Supreme Court had rejected the federal retirees' tax 
rebate claims, the Oregon Legislature crafted another benefit enhancement for its state 
retirees. This time, and unlike the earlier flat percentage increases to the retirement benefit, 
the 1995 legislation established a complex formula which effectively calculated the amount 
of state retiree income which would be lost to state taxes and then increased the retiree's 
benefit by that same amount. The formula quoted and paralleled the maximum state income 
tax rate and allowed the retirement benefit increase to fluctuate with that rate. The statute 
expressly provided that no rights, contractual or otherwise, were granted to retirees by reason 
of the increase in benefits. The Legislature then expressly declared that the new benefit 
increase was payment and compensation for damages suffered by retirees as a result of the 
taxation of their retirement benefits. Oregon Laws 1995, Chapter 569. This time the Oregon 
Supreme Court held that: 
Clearly, as the state moves closer to replacing the lost net 
income on a dollar-for dollar basis , the fact that the increase is 
in fact a tax rebate, rather than a general increase in 
compensation to "make up" for lost income, becomes more 
apparent. 
VogL,960P.2dat380. 
The Court was equally clear in its conclusions that this holding was confined to the 
1995 statutory scheme and that neither Ragsdale nor its analysis of the 1991 statutory scheme 
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was overruled. 
Appellants' cite Vogl as support for their proposition that the 3 % benefit enhancement 
is a tax rebate. But nowhere in Utah's statutory 3% retirement enhancement provisions is 
there even any mention of a relationship with the Utah income tax structure, let alone any 
dollar-for-dollar replacement formula. Appellants' reliance on Vogl is misplaced and must 
fail. 
The Montana Legislature's response to Davis was also similar in some respects to 
Utah's response. Montana eliminated the state retirement income exemption and enacted a 
2.5% benefit increase for its retirees. However, two new factors surfaced that were critical 
in the Montana Supreme Court's analysis of Montana's benefit increase. First, unlike Utah, 
only retirees living in Montana would receive the increase. Second, also unlike Utah, the 
cost of the benefit enhancement was not funded by retirement investment income and 
employer and employee contributions, but by direct legislative appropriations out of the 
office of the Montana State Treasurer. 
In Sheehv v. Public employees Retirement Division, 864 P.2d 762 (Mont. 1993), the 
Montana Supreme Court sided with the federal retirees and declared the benefit to be a 
discriminatory tax. However, contrary to Appellants' assertions, Sheehv was not decided in 
favor of the federal retirees because the replacement benefit and the tax exemption which it 
replaced were somehow "related," or that there was some dollar for dollar replacement. The 
Montana Court ruled in the federal retirees' favor because that Court could not find any 
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evidence of a legitimate retirement benefit. These two factors, which the Court found to be 
the compelling evidence in that determination, are notably absent in Utah's case. The Sheehy 
Court even offered its assistance in determining what the benefit should have looked like to 
pass muster: 
If it were a pension benefit, the State would have provided it to 
all of its retirees in recognition of their years of public service 
rather then just those living in Montana.... 
Further evidence that the adjustment is not an actual increased 
retirement benefit for retired state employees is the fact that the 
funding of the section 5 adjustment bears no resemblance to the 
funding of actual state retirement benefit adjustments previously 
enacted by the Legislature... Here the funding for the so-called 
retirement adjustment payment is statutorily appropriated from 
the general fund pursuant to section 4 of chapter 823-that is, 
from the taxes collected from all Montana taxpayers. The money 
to pay the adjustment never goes into the state retirement funds, 
but is simply paid by the state treasurer to the retirement boards, 
to be distributed by the boards in accordance with the provisions 
of chapter 823. 
Sheehy, 864 P.2d at 768. 
This Court must contrast Montana's benefit with Utah's benefit. The record is clear 
that the determinable factors in Montana are absent in Utah's benefit enhancement. First, in 
Utah, all eligible employees, regardless of their state of domicile, receive the benefit. Second, 
the funding for Utah's benefit enhancement is actuarially determined, made up of employer 
contributions, employee contributions, and investment returns and is part of the employees' 
compensation package. Third, the benefit itself is paid out of the retirement funds, not by 
separate and direct legislative appropriation. 
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Most persuasively, the final state court decision rendered on this issue was decided 
in Virginia. Virginia's response to Davis involved both a direct legislative appropriation to 
retirees ($15.75 million) and a 3% adjustment to state retirees' benefits. Virginia also 
repealed the state employees retirement income exemption. 
The Virginia court's analysis is noteworthy inasmuch as the tax rebate argument was 
considered in light of the assumption that Plaintiffs' factual allegations about the nature of 
the payments (identical to those presented by Appellants' here) were all true. In finding 
against the federal retirees on all counts and upholding both the appropriation and the benefit 
adjustment, the Circuit Court of Virginia noted that the Davis Court had expressly 
recognized, and was not offended by, the fact that a state's response to the Davis decision 
might be to give extra money to state retirees to make up for the money those retirees lost as 
a result of taxation. Almeter v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 53 Va. Cir. 429 (2000), 
cert, refused, No.010270, Va. (April 20, 2001), cert, denied, 122 S. Ct. 202 (mem) (Oct. 1, 
2001). Notably absent from its analysis was any discussion of the reasoning applied by the 
Ragsdale, Vogl and Sheehy Courts. For Virginia, the clear and unequivocable language of 
the United States Supreme Court in Davis was dispositive. So should it be here. The fact 
that the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case is consistent with its Davis 
decision philosophy that the states should be allowed to fashion their own remedies. 
There is a common thread that appears throughout the Oregon, Montana and Virginia 
court holdings. Underlying each court's analysis was an understanding that a retirement benefit 
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enhancement does not become an illegal tax rebate because it is "related" to the Davis 
decision. Nor does it become an illegal tax rebate because a Legislature may have intended 
that the retirement benefit enhancement replace in some measure the loss of a retirement 
income tax exemption for state and local government employees. Judge Nehring clearly 
understood that analysis. Appellants evidently do not inasmuch as they still appear to be 
laboring under the mistaken belief that "the pension increase is clearly and expressly part of 
Utah's tax code." Appellant's Brief at 23, n. 5. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE 3% RETIREMENT BENEFIT ENHANCEMENT SERVES AS A 
SUBSTANTIAL SUBSTITUTE FOR THE LOSS OF THE RETIREMENT 
INCOME EXEMPTION AND AS SUCH CANNOT BE AN ILLEGAL TAX 
REBATE, 
There is no argument between Appellants and the Board that the 3% benefit 
enhancement was intended to be, and is in fact, a "vested right." Appellee's Brief, at 27. As 
such, it is entitled to the same protection that this Court has granted continuously over the 
past half century to pension contract rights. This Court has created a doctrine, well known 
to all branches of government and beneficiaries of the retirement system, that no retirement 
benefit that has vested can be taken away or diminished by legislative or Board action unless 
a "substantial substitute" is provided as a replacement for the loss of the "vested right."2 
2
 In fact, Appellants appear to have no reservation in declaring that the Legislature 
breached its contract with retirees, Appellants' Brief at 27, n.8., an allegation the Board certainly 
denies. Given that State and local government retirees have not pursued a claim for fourteen 
18 
In the earliest of this Court's decisions on point, Newcomb v. Ogden City Public 
School Teachers' Retirement Commission, 243 P.2d 941 (Utah 1952), the Court traced the 
history and differing states' theories of vested rights and concluded that in Utah, '\ . . 
the Legislature may not provide for the termination of a retirement system unless a 
substantial substitute is provided for in lieu of the loss of benefits sustained by pensioners 
or annuitants . . . . " Driggs v. Utah Teachers' Retirement Board, 142 P.2d 657 (Utah 1943) 
declared that the retirement allowance of a retired teacher could not be reduced after 
retirement. In recent cases the Court has reiterated these long standing principles, and 
expanded its application to all those circumstances where a person has accepted an offer of 
the state or one of its agencies, and has met all the conditions prerequisite to receiving a 
benefit. In such cases the state is bound to perform on its contractual agreements the same 
as a private person must perform. See, Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Board, 770 P.2d 
93, 95 (Utah 1988). 
With respect to retirees the rule of law is clear. There can be no legislative reduction 
or elimination of vested contractual pension rights where a person has met all the conditions 
precedent for receiving the pension unless a substantial substitute is granted in place of the 
reduction or elimination of benefits. Because the Legislature explicitly made the 3% 
adjustment part of the base benefit and because that base retirement cannot be diminished or 
years after the creation of the "replacement benefit" testifies that the replacement benefit itself is 
indeed a substantial substitute for the loss of the tax exemption and consistent with this Court's 
protection of retirees' vested rights. 
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eliminated by subsequent legislative enactments, the 3% benefit must be a vested right. 
Even Appellants' own lead case, Vogl, noted the difference between a contractual 
vested right and a legitimate compensation increase: 
. . . If the increase was, in fact, part of PERS employees' 
compensation, we would expect those employees to obtain a 
vested right to it. 
Vogl, 960 P.2d at 380. 
While Oregon's benefit expressly provided that there was no contractual right to the 
benefit, Utah's retirees do have a vested right to the benefit enhancement. See, supra at 8-10. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no support in Utah Code Ann. §49-1-701 (1998) for Plaintiffs' theory that 
the benefit is a tax rebate. In this case, what that law does not say is as important as what it 
does say and speaks volumes. Namely, there is no attempt to coordinate the 3% benefit with 
the income tax rates or structure under the tax code. There is no direct legislative 
appropriation to retirees to pay for this benefit enhancement. Indeed, there is no long-term 
balancing of tax receipts with retirement costs which would one expect if the Legislature was 
rebating the tax collected to the retirees through the 3% adjustment. Moreover, such a 
correlation would be impossible, since the taxation of state employees retirement income is 
now, pursuant to Davis, of infinite duration, while the 3% adjustment has a limited life span, 
ending upon the death of the last retiree eligible to receive the benefit under Utah Code Ann. 
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§49-1-701(1998). And finally, there is no correlation between the 3% adjustment and the 
State's effective income tax rate of 7%. It is painfully obvious to the highly compensated 
state retiree, if such a retiree can indeed be found to exist, that the 3% adjustment is in no 
way an adequate replacement for the loss of the tax exemption. At the same time, at the 
opposite end of the financial spectrum, the meager pensions of the state's earliest retirees 
would not be taxable under the new tax structure anyway, since the first $4,800 of retirement 
income is exempt (or a $7,500 personal exemption upon reaching age 65). For this group, 
the 3% adjustment is a tax free bonus payment. In neither of these examples, nor in the cases 
of the tens of thousands of other retirees receiving the 3% adjustment, does the benefit itself 
replace dollar-for-dollar the loss of the tax exemption, nor was it designed to accomplish that 
improbable feat. 
In truth, faced with the task of strict adherence to the Davis doctrine, while honoring 
its commitment to its employees, the Legislature acted appropriately in repealing the 
offensive tax exemption and simultaneously honoring its long standing commitments to 
retirees by making up for the loss of the exemption with a benefit enhancement which has 
no correlation with the tax code, and which the Davis Court anticipated and approved. 
Having considered all of these facts in favor of Appellants, this Court is left with the 
inescapable conclusion that the 3 % replacement benefit enhancement is not related to or part 
of the state tax structure, is consistent with actions taken and upheld in other states, and is 
consistent with and expressly authorized by Davis. 
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For these reasons, Respondent respectfully requests this Court to uphold Judge 
(Justice) Nehring' s Order dismissing this claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this'Zi day of November, 2003. 
By:. I 
Kevin A. Howard 
Gregory D. Phillips 
Daniel D. Andersen 
Attorney for the Appellee, 
Utah State Retirement Board 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum "A" Minute Entry, Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 
010911230, entered on April, 4,2003 
Addendum "B" Order of Dismissal, Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 
010911230, entered on May 13,2003. 
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ADDENDUM "A 
-TL' 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH By~~^? 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT /) 
RICHARD C. THOMPSON et. al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, et. 
ax» / 
Defendants. 
J—P ,., 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 010 91123 0 
JUDGE RONALD E. NEHRING 
This matter is before me on defendants1 Motion to Dismiss the 
plaintiffs1 complaint. For the reasons stated below, I grant 
defendants' motion. 
On September 19, 1989, the Utah legislature made state 
retirement income as well as federal retirement income taxable, 
while at the same time increasing pension benefits to state 
retirees by 3%. Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (1998) . Plaintiffs, 
retirees who were employed by the federal government, challenge the 
state's decision to increase pension benefits to state retirees, 
claiming that the benefits are merely a replacement for the lost 
tax exemption and essentially constitute tax rebates to State 
retirees. 
A full understanding of the nature of plaintiffs1 claims 
requires a historical explanation. Prior to 1989, 21 state 
exempted recipients of state retirement benefits from income tax 
while imposing income tax on the benefits of federal retirees. In 
1989, the United States Supreme Court ended this practice, finding 
rb°i 
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that it constituted unlawful tax discrimination in violation of 
federal law and the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. 
Davis v Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (1989). 
Utah, like many sister states, responded to the Supreme 
Court !s edict by amending its statute to make state retirement 
benefits taxable. The legislature also increased pension benefits 
to state retirees by 3%. Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (1998). It is 
undisputed that the increase in retirement benefits largely offsets 
the amount of income tax which an individual Utah retiree would be 
required to pay. 
Plaintiffs contend that Utah's response to the mandate of 
Davis was nothing more than a sham that merely perpetuated the 
unlawful discrimination which existed pre-Davis where federal 
retirees pay full state income tax on their benefits while state 
retirees pay less than full state income tax on their benefits 
because of the rebate. 
I have reviewed the reported cases addressing similar 
challenges to legislative responses to Davis. See, Sheehy v 
Association of Montana Retired Public Employees, 864 P.2d 785 
(Mont. 1993), Ragsdale v Department of Revenue, 895 P. 2d 1348 
(1995), Voal v Department of Revenue, 960 P.2d 373 (Or. 1997), 
Almeter v Virginia Department of Taxation, 53 Va. Cir. 429 (2000) 
cert denied. Irrespective of outcome, these cases recognize that 
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the Davis court did not foreclose; and in fact anticipated, a 
state ls ability to respond to the court's holding by increasing 
benefits to its retirees. Those cases which invalidated, as 
violative of Davis, increases in state retiree benefits, did so 
only because the benefit increases incorporated additional 
provisions which made transparent the true and improper nature of 
the response creating a tax rebate. 
Specifically, in Sheehy the Montana Supreme Court concluded 
that Montana rs response to Davis was actually a discriminatory 
partial tax rebate that improperly favored state retirees "living 
in Montana based solely on the source of their retirement income. 
864 P.2d 762, 768 (1993) . Further evidence of a tax rebate was the 
fact that Montanals funding for the adjustment was statutorily 
appropriated from the general fund and not funded by investment 
income produced by the retirement fund itself. Id. at 768. 
Similarly, in Voal it was determined that Oregon !s 1995 
statutory increase to the Public Employees Retirement System 
("PERS") benefits to compensate for "injuries" arising out of the 
taxation of the PERS benefits was in violation of Davis. 960 P. 2d 
373 (1997) . The Vogl Court ultimately concluded that the increase 
in PERS benefits was a tax rebate because the relationship between 
the lost exemption and the 1995 increase was one of "purported 
legal equivalence." Id. at 381. 
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Upon consideration of these cases, I conclude that Utah's 
statutory response to Davis is untainted by any of the above 
mentioned provisions from which one could reasonably conclude that 
the benefit increase was, in fact, a tax rebate. 
It would be disingenuous for me to suggest that the timing and 
content of the amendments to Utah Code Ann. , Section 49-1-701 
(1998), did not reflect our legislature's desire to accomplish by 
lawful means the result which the Davis court found' to be 
impermissibly discriminatory. The timing and intent of the 
legislature's response to Davis is not, however , controlling. Of 
primary importance is the plain language of the statutory product 
of the legislature's response to Davis. The statute itself applies 
to all members whose retirement allowance was previously exempt 
from tax, pre-Davis, but whose allowance has "subsequently become 
subject to that tax." Specifically, a member shall receive: 
(a) the administrator shall calculate the member's retirement 
allowance pursuant to the formula governing the system 
from which the member retired; 
(b) the administrator shall then increase the allowance 
calculated under Subsection (2) (a) by 3%; and; 
(c) the adjusted retirement allowance under Subsection (2) (b) 
is the new basis upon which any future adjustments to 
benefits are made 
UCA § 49-11-701 (2002) \ 
Additionally, under subsection (6) , 
]The 2 002 amendment, effective March 27, 2002, renumbered 
this section, formerly referred to as § 49-1-701. 
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(a) [t]he retirement board shall annually certify the 
contribution rate necessary for each system to comply 
with this section and may adopt rules to administer this 
section. 
(b) [t]his contribution rate shall be reported separately from 
the total contribution rate necessary to fund the systems 
on an actuarially sound basis and may not be used in 
comparative studies of public employee benefits. 
UCA § 49-11-701 (2002) . 
A close look at these statutory provisions indicates 'that the 
language betrays no discriminatory content. First, the 3% 
adjustment is given to all retirees who were members of the system. 
There is no distinction between retirees located in the state of 
Utah and those located out of state. Essentially, every eligible 
retiree who retired on or after January 1, 1989 received the 3% 
increase. UCA § 49-1-701(1)(3)(1998). Second, the statute itself 
evidences no attempt to coordinate the 3% benefit with the income 
tax rates or structure as found under Utah Code Ann, Title 59. 
Finally, distinguishing itself from Sheehv, the plain language 
shows that the legislature does not fund the 3% adjustment via 
direct legislative appropriation of tax dollars to eligible 
retirees. UCA § 49-1-701 (G). Ultimately, the total cost is 
recognized as a direct part of the total employees' compensation 
package• 
This statutory analysis, coupled with the Davis court's clear 
anticipation of the Utah legislature's response, through its 
: ^ 
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holding, warrants the conclusion that plaintiffs1 claim must fail 
as a matter of law and defendant's motion is hereby granted. 
In view of the foregoing, I need not reach the other arguments 
advance by defendant in aid of its motion. 
Defendant's counsel shall prepare an Order consistent with 
this Minute Entry, 
Dated this /£*>* day of April, 2003. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
DaputyCtork 
RICHARD C. THOMPSON et. al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
et. al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 010911230 
Judge Ronald E. Nehring 
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on 
August 20, 2002, pursuant to the Motion to Dismiss of the Utah 
State Tax Commission Defendants. On August 23, 2002, the Court 
entered an Order joining the State Retirement Board. Subsequent 
to that order, Plaintiffs, Tax Commission Defendants, and the 
State Retirement Board agreed on a schedule and filed memoranda 
to supplement the Motion to Dismiss that was heard on August 23, 
2002. Plaintiffs were represented by Gary Dodge, Kevin W. Bates, 
and Mark R. Clements of the law firm of Hatch, James and Dodge. 
The Tax Commission was represented by John C. McCarrey and 
Timothy A. Bodily, Assistant Attorneys General. The Utah State 
Retirement Board was represented by Kevin A. Howard, Gregory D. 
Phillips, Daniel D. Andersen, and David B. Hansen of the law firm 
Howard, Phillips and Andersen. 
The State Retirement Board joined in the pending Motion to 
Dismiss. After reviewing the supplemental pleadings, the Court 
concluded that the oral argument held on August 20, 2002, was 
sufficient and that further oral argument would not aid the Court 
in its decision-
Having reviewed the pleadings of the parties submitted prior 
to the hearing, and having reviewed the subsequent pleadings 
filed by Plaintiffs, the Tax Commission Defendants, and the Utah 
State Retirement Board, this case is dismissed pursuant to Rule 
12(B)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons 
stated below, I grant Defendants' motion. 
On September 19, 1989, the Utah legislature made state 
retirement income as well as federal retirement income taxable, 
while at the same time increasing pension benefits to state 
2 
retirees by 3%. Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (1998). Plaintiffs, 
retirees who were employed by the federal government, challenge 
the state' s decision to increase pension benefits to state 
retirees, claiming that the benefits are merely a replacement for 
the lost tax exemption and essentially constitute tax rebates to 
State retirees. 
A full understanding of the nature of Plaintiffs' claims 
requires an historical explanation. Prior to 1989, 21 states 
exempted recipients of state retirement benefits from income tax 
while imposing income tax on the benefits of federal retirees. 
In 198 9, the Unites State Supreme Court ended this practice, 
finding that it constituted unlawful tax discrimination in 
violation of federal law and the doctrine of intergovernmental 
tax immunity. Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (1989). 
Utah, like many sister states, responded to the Supreme 
Court's edict by amending its statute to make state retirement 
benefits taxable. The legislature also increased pension 
benefits to state retirees by 3%. Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-7 01 
(1998) . It is undisputed that the increase in retirement 
benefits largely offsets the amount of income tax which an 
individual Utah retiree would be required to pay. 
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Plaintiffs contend that Utah's response to the mandate of 
Davis was nothing more than a sham that merely perpetuated the 
unlawful discrimination which existed pre-Davis where federal 
retirees pay full state income tax on their benefits while state 
retirees pay less than full state income tax on their benefits 
because of the rebate. 
I have reviewed the reported cases addressing similar 
challenges to legislative responses to Davis. See, S'heehv v. 
Association of Montana Retired Public Employees, 864 P.2d 786 
(Mont. 1993), Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348 
(Or. 1995), Voal v. Department of Revenue, 960 P.2d 373 (Or. 
1997), Almeter v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 53 Va. Cir. 
429 (2000) cert denied, 122 S.Ct. 202 (Mem.) (2001). Irrespective 
of outcome, these cases recognize that the Davis Court did not 
foreclose, and in fact anticipated, a state's ability to respond 
to the Court's holding by increasing benefits to its-retirees. 
Those cases which invalidated, as violative of Davis, increases 
in state retiree benefits, did so only because the benefit 
increases incorporated additional provisions which made 
transparent the true and improper nature of the response— 
creating a tax rebate. 
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Specifically, in Sheehy the Montana Supreme Court concluded 
that Montana's response to Davis was actually a discriminatory 
partial tax rebate that improperly favored state retirees ^living 
in Montana based solely on the source of their retirement 
income." Sheehy, 864 P.2d at 768 (1993). Further evidence of a 
tax rebate wa£ the fact that Montana's funding for the adjustment 
was statutorily appropriated from the general fund and not funded 
by investment income produced by the retirement fund Itself. Id. 
Similarly, in Vogl, it was determined that Oregon's 1995 
statutory increase to the Public Employees Retirement System 
("PERS") benefits to compensate for "injuries" arising out of the 
taxation of the PERS benefits was in violation of Davis. Vogl, 
960 P.2d 373 (1997). The Vogl court ultimately concluded that 
the increase in PERS benefits was a tax rebate because the 
relationship between the lost exemption and the 1995 increase was 
one of "purported legal equivalence." Id. at 381. 
Upon consideration of these cases, I conclude that Utah's 
statutory response to Davis is untainted by any of the above 
mentioned provisions from which one could reasonably conclude 
that the benefit increase was, in fact, a tax rebate. 
It would be disingenuous for me to suggest that the timing 
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and content of the amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 4 9-1-7 01 
(1998) , did not reflect our legislature's desire to accomplish by 
lawful means the result which the Davis Court found to be 
impermissibly discriminatory. The timing and intent of the 
legislature's response to Davis is not, however, controlling. Of 
primary importance is the plain language of the statutory product 
of the legislature's response to Davis. The statute itself 
applies to all members whose retirement allowance was previously 
exempt from tax, pre-Davis, but whose allowance has ^subsequently 
become subject to the tax." Specifically, a member shall 
receive: 
(a) the administrator shall calculate the member's 
retirement allowance pursuant to the formula 
governing the system from which the member 
retired; 
(b) the administrator shall then increase the 
allowance calculated under Subsection (2)(a) by 
3%; and 
(c) the adjusted retirement allowance under Subsection 
(2)(b) is the new basis upon which any future 
adjustments to benefits are made. 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-701 (2002)l. 
Additionally, under subsection (6) 
(a) [t]he retirement board shall annually certify the 
1
 The 2002 amendment, effective March 27, 2002, renumbered 
this section, formerly referred to as Section 49-1-701. 
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contribution rate necessary for each system to 
comply with this section and may adopt rules ro 
administer this section, 
(b) [t]his contribution rate shall be reported 
separately from the total contribution rate 
necessary to fund the systems on an actuarially 
sound basis and may not be used in comparative 
studies of public employee benefits. 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-701 (2002). 
A close look at these statutory provisions indicates that 
the language betrays no discriminatory content. First, the 3% 
adjustment is given to all retirees who were members of the 
system. There is no distinction between retirees located in the 
state of Utah and those located out of state. Essentially, every 
eligible retiree who retired on or after January 1, 1989, 
received the 3% increase.^ Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (1) (3) 
(1998). Second, the>, statute itself evidences no attempt-to 
coordinate the 3% benefit with the income tax rates or structure 
as found under Utah Code Ann., Title 59. Finally, distinguishing 
itself from Sheehy, the plain language shows that the legislature 
does not fund the 3% adjustment via direct legislative 
appropriation of tax dollars to eligible retirees. Utah Code 
Ann. § 49-1-701(6) (1998). Ultimately, the total cost is 
recognized as a direct part of the total employeesr compensation 
package. 
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This statutory analysis, coupled with the Davis Court's 
clear anticipation of the Utah legislature's response, through 
its holding, warrants the conclusion that Plaintiffs' claims must 
fail as a matter of law, and Defendants' motion is hereby 
granted. 
In view of the foregoing, I need not reach the other 
arguments advanced by Defendants in aid of their motion. 
DATED this l^> day of (fy\ 2003, 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RONAL 
Distri 
Hatch, James & Dodge 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Howard, Phillips & Andersen 
Attorneys for Utah State Retirement 
Board 
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